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I. Introduction
Although Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S.Ct. 
2886 (1992), is viewed by many as simply further littering the 
jurisprudential landscape concerning "regulatory takings", its 
treatment of (1) the "investment backed expectations" justifi­
cation for finding a protected property right and (2) the 
importance of limitations on protection which "inhere in the 
title itself" may have a significant impact in the western 
public resources field.
II. Investment Backed Expectations
A. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court and Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion reinforce the importance of 
"investment backed expectations" first announced in Penn 
Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978) :
"The economic impact of regulation on the 
claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment backed expectations are, of course, 
relevant considerations."
B. Western state and federal statutes allocating public 
water and land resources almost uniformly have as their 
basic objective the encouragement of investment in 
development of the resource.
C. State and federal programs to preserve or promote other 
environmental values are a more recent overlay to those 
development statutes and the attempt to accommodate the 
two policies is at the root of regulatory takings issues.
D. Professor Sax discerns a subliminal message in Lucas 
drawing a line in the sand protecting traditional 
development rights against growing environmentalist
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encroachment that would require property owners to 
elevate protection of the natural values of their land 
over its exploitation, without compensation. Sax, 
"Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council." 45 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1433 (1993).
III. Limitations Which "Inhere in the Title Itself"
A. Justice Scalia's opinion qualified the Court's "expecta­
tions" factor as follows, 112 S.Ct. 2899, 2900 (emphasis 
added):
"Where the State seeks to sustain regulation 
that deprives land of all economically benefi­
cial use, we think it may resist compensation 
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into 
the nature of the owner's estate shows that 
the proscribed use interests were not part of 
his title to begin with. . . . Any limita­
tion so severe cannot be newly legislated or 
decreed (without compensation), but must 
inhere in the title itself, in the restric­
tions that background principles of the 
State's law of property and nuisance already 
place upon land ownership."
Professor Sax concludes that "though the Lucas ma­
jority does not say so explicitly, its adoption of a 
standard based upon historically bounded nuisance and 
property law reflects a sentiment that a state should 
compensate landowners who, through no fault of their own, 
lose property rights because of scientific or social 
transformation." Sax, supra at 1449. In short, if 
changing social values require adjustment or curtailment 
of existing property interests for the benefit of the
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"general public", the government should bear the cost of 
any econimic impacts on the property owner. This plainly 
is "the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause 
that has become part of our constitutional culture" 
referred to by Justice Scalia. 112 S.Ct. at 2900, note 
15.
B. The search for "restrictions" and "background principles" 
is easier in public natural resources law than it is for 
other kinds of property interests. Allocation statutes 
and the administrative instruments dispensing development 
rights are a readily available and reliable source for 
defining the scope of such rights, although other 
background principles may sometimes come into play, e.g. , 
nuisance principles for certain kinds of development 
activities.
1. Public resource allocation statutes or instruments
usually contain express limitations, such as prohi­
bitions on "waste" of water and requirements for 
its "beneficial use", requirements for "diligent 
development" of mineral resources, maintenance of 
specified range or forest conditions, and other 
express limitations which "inhere in the title 
itself" and presumably may be enforced without 
compensation. See Sax, "Rights That 'Inhere in the 
Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas Case on
Western Water Law," 26 Loyola LA 943 (1993).
2. Such statutes and instruments do not usually con­
tain limitations reserving unilateral authority to 
alter the allocated development right on "public 
trust", "new societal values", and similar grounds 
which some courts have discovered elsewhere. 
Consequently, it seems unlikely that the Lucas 
Court would permit retroactive judicial or legisla­
tive redefinition of express elements of grants of 
development rights reflecting an approach of
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"shooting first and painting a bullseye around the 
bullet hole." Compare Summa Corp. v. California ex 
rel. State Lands Comm, et al.. 466 U.S. 198 (1984) 
(sovereign public trust rights not reserved in land 
patent or asserted in patent confirmation proceed­
ings do not burden the patent) and Hughes v. Wash­
ington . 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) ("[A] State cannot
be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibi­
tion against taking property without due process of 
law by the simple device of asserting retroactively 
that it never existed." (Concurring opinion)) with 
Texaco. Inc, v. Short. 454 U.S. 516 (1982) (a state 
may prospectively terminate dormant severed mineral 
interests without compensation after a reasonable 
period, even without personal notice to mineral 
owners (5-4 decision)) and United States v. Locke. 
471 U.S. 84 (1985) (Congress may impose reasonable 
filing requirements on existing mining claims and 
provide for forfeiture of such claims without 
compensation for failure to comply).
3. The critical questions about the scope of protec­
tion of public resource development rights reflect­
ed in the dispositive statute or instrument should 
be: "What did the user reasonably know and when did 
he or she know it?"
C. Expectations which fly in the face of clear limitations 
in development rights are not reasonable, whether or not 
backed by investment, and should not be the basis for a 
protected legal right to compensation, although in some 
cases they arguably should trigger equitable protection 
where justifiable reliance is placed on agency interpre­
tation or knowledgeable acquiescence in user interpreta­
tion of ambiguous terms.
D. The Court will have to address the issues of whether 
resource development rights are protected by the princi-
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ples announced in Lucas for "land" as opposed to "person­
al property", 112 S.Ct. at 2899-2900, and the corpus of 
the affected interest in "partial" vs. "total" curtail­
ment of such rights. Id. at 2894, note 7.
IV. Future Legislative and Administrative Policy
A. Responsible legislatures and administrative agencies have 
the ability, and many would say the duty to provide 
clear, adequate and certain provisions regarding develop­
ment rights tenure, e.q., duration, operating conditions, 
time for periodic adjustments, etc. "Catchall" savings 
provisions, such as those subjecting the development 
right to "all future regulations" or the agency's 
authority to make unilateral changes "in the public 
interest" should be discouraged. The Public Land Law 
Review Commission addressed the general issue in its 197 0 
report, One Third of the Nation's Lands (page 133, 
emphasis added):
Under the existing leasing system, administra­
tors have considerable authority through 
regulation and practice to modify operating 
conditions unilaterally. This has led to 
misunderstandings and a lack of confidence in 
lease tenure, particularly among producers of 
leasable minerals other than oil and gas. We 
recommend that, as nearly as practicable, all 
rights and obligations, including those relat­
ed to maintenance of the environment, of 
mineral explorers and developers be clearly 
defined at the outset of their undertakings, 
and the unilateral authority to modify opera­
tional and payment requirements should be 
limited under guidelines to be specified by 
the Congress. It is unfair for one party to 
an arrangement to have the unilateral power to 
impose higher royalty obligations or more
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B.
stringent operating conditions on the other 
party, particularly when no standards are 
specified for such changes.
Correspondingly, when tenure provisions are overridden 
because of other public interest considerations, comp­
ensation should be provided either monetarily or possibly 
by enhancement of other aspects of the adjusted develop­
ment right:
Statutory provision [should] be made to assure 
that when public lands or their resources are 
made available for use, firm tenure and secu­
rity of investment be provided so that if the 
use must be interrupted because of a Federal 
Government need before the end of the lease, 
permit, or other contractual arrangement, the 
user will be equitably compensated for the 
resulting losses.
Id. at 4. See also. Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. 
Andrus, 653 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stipulation in 
permit to drill on a federal oil and gas lease prohibit­
ing drilling for certain periods during the lease term 
requires equivalent extension of lease term).
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